

Message Text

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ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 NEA-11 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 ACDA-12 AID-05 EB-08 TRSE-00

HA-05 /130 W

-----110600 080905Z /12

R 071718Z JUN 78

FM AMEMBASSY BAMA KO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9672

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BAMA KO 2677

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS MOPS EFIN EAID CG FR ML

SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON RECOVERY EFFORT FOR ZAIRE: MALI

REF: STATE 140672, 140847, AND 141234

1. SUMMARY. I PRESENTED THE U.S. POSITION ON OUR EFFORT IN ZAIRE AS INSTRUCTED IN REFTELS TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY ON JUNE 6. ALTHOUGH MALI ACKNOWLEDGES MOBUTU'S RIGHT TO REQUEST FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, IT DOES NOT BELIEVE THE U.S. RESPONSE IN AIRLIFTING MOROCCAN TROOPS IS THE CORRECT ONE. IT PREFERS THE UNITED STATES TO USE ITS POLITICAL INFLUENCE TO ATTAIN A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF ZAIRE. END SUMMARY.

2. I PRESENTED OUR POSITION ON ZAIRE AND OUR ACTION IN AIRLIFTING MOROCCAN TROOPS IN AND FRENCH TROOPS OUT TO SEYDOU TRAORE, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ON JUNE 6. I MADE ALL POINTS AS INSTRUCTED IN THE REFERENCED TELEGRAMS, STRESSING OUR INTEREST IN THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY
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OF ZAIRE AND THE PRECISELY LIMITED NATURE OF OUR INTERVENTION IN RESPONSE TO ZAIRIAN, MOROCCAN, AND FRENCH REQUESTS.

3. THE SECRETARY GENERAL LISTENED CAREFULLY AND HAD A NOTE-TAKER, BUT AT THE CONCLUSION OF MY PRESENTATION HE VERY POLITELY SAID THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THOSE TIMES WHEN WE WERE SIMPLY NOT IN AGREEMENT.

4. HE INSISTED THAT NO MATTER HOW RESTRICTED OUR ACTION WE WERE NEVERTHELESS IMPLICATED IN THE AFFAIR AND WOULD BE SO SEEN BY THE KATANGANS, WHO WERE DEEPLY EMBITTERED BY THE MOROCCAN INTERVENTION OF LAST YEAR. BRINGING OUTSIDE AFRICAN TROOPS INTO THE PROBLEM ONLY SOWED HATRED AMONG AFRICAN STATES, AND AFRICA ALREADY HAD ENOUGH PRESSURES TOWARD DISSENSION AND DISUNITY. MALI, HE SAID, MUCH PREFERRED THE POLICY THE UNITED STATES HAD UNTIL RECENTLY PURSUED, THAT OF RESTRAINT AND NONINTERVENTION IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS, AND USING ONLY AMERICA'S MORAL AND POLITICAL WEIGHT TO ACHIEVE NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SOLUTIONS.

5. THE SECRETARY GENERAL ACKNOWLEDGED THE RIGHT OF ANY SOVEREIGN STATE TO ASK FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, AND HE REITERATED MALI'S STRONG BELIEF IN THE OAU PRINCIPLE OF THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS INHERITED FROM THE COLONIAL POWERS. MALI, HOWEVER, DID NOT SEE THE SHABA PROBLEM IN THAT LIGHT. SAYING HE WOULD LEAVE ASIDE ALL DISCUSSION OF RELATED PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA TO FOCUS STRICTLY ON THE "KATANGAN GENDARMES", TRAORE CONTENTED THAT THE "KATANGANS" OR "SHABANS" WERE ACTUALLY "ZAIROIS" WHO WANTED TO GO HOME. THEY WERE REFUGEES, AND A POLITICAL SOLUTION WAS NEEDED TO ALLOW THEM TO RETURN. AFTER LAST YEAR'S SHABA AFFAIR THE OAU HAD LABORED MIGHTILY TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD

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PERMIT THE KATANGANS TO GO BACK TO ZAIRE, AND THE OAU THOUGHT IT HAD DONE SO. BUT WHEN THE FIRST GROUP CROSSED OVER, THEY WERE SHOT TO DEATH, HE SAID. THAT MEANT NOTHING WAS LEFT TO THEM EXCEPT TO RESORT TO VIOLENCE IN ORDER TO EXERCISE THE REFUGEES' INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED RIGHT TO RESETTLE IN THEIR HOMELAND.

6. WHEN I POINTED TO THE CARNAGE THE "REFUGEES" HAD LEFT, THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPLIED THAT HE HAD READ AN ARTICLE IN "LE MONDE" BY A BELGIAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MAN WHO SAID THE KATANGANS HAD INITIALLY WORKED WITH FOREIGN TECHNICIANS IN SHABA AND THAT THE KILLING HAD BEGUN ONLY AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE FRENCH PARATROOPERS' MOVE.

7. NOTING OUR CLEARLY VERY DIFFERENT OPTICS, I SAID OUR INFORMATION INDICATED THE KATANGANS WERE NOT MERELY TRYING TO RETURN TO THEIR NATIVE SOIL BUT WERE BENT UPON THE DISMEMBERMENT OF ZAIRE. TRAORE VIGOROUSLY REFUTED THE POINT. HE SAID HE HAD HEARD NO STATEMENT AND HAD READ NO DOCUMENT THAT SHOWED THE KATANGANS IN ANY WAY TO HAVE SECESSION IN MIND. THE CONGO RESURRECTION

MOVEMENT IN BRUSSELS MIGHT WELL WANT TO OVERTHROW MOBOTU,
BUT IN NO INSTANCE SO FAR AS HE KNEW WAS THE TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY OF ZAIRE AT ISSUE.

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8. THE SECRETARY GENERAL ASSERTED SEVERAL TIMES THAT IF
A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE KATANGAN GENDARMES PROBLEM
WERE NOT FOUND AND IF FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
REFORMS WERE NOT MADE IN ALL OF ZAIRE, HE AND I WOULD BE
TALKING ABOUT A THIRD SHABA INVASION NEXT YEAR AS WE HAD
DONE ABOUT THE FIRST A YEAR AGO, OR IT MIGHT BE IN ONLY
SIX MONTHS AND THE FREQUENCY AND EXTENT OF VIOLENCE WOULD
INCREASE.

9. TRAORE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT AFTER THE CURRENT AIR-
LIFT EPISODE THE UNITED STATES WOULD REVERT TO ITS EARLIER
POLICY OF RESTRAINT AND WOULD USE ITS POLITICAL INFLUENCE
TO ACHIEVE THE ESSENTIAL NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS
OF ZAIRE.

10. COMMENT: THIS CONVERSATION WENT ROUND AND ROUND
FOR SOME TIME, ALL IN REASONABLE TONES. I REPEATED
OUR POSITIONS, REBUTTED TO THE LIMITS OF INFORMATION
AVAILABLE HERE, AND REFERRED TO THE PARIS AND BRUSSELS
MEETINGS ON ZAIRE, BUT OUR BASIC APPRECIATIONS DIVERGE.
IF THE DEPARTMENT HAS ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTATION OR
MATERIAL THAT I COULD USEFULLY PRESENT TO THE SECRETARY
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GENERAL, WE WOULD WELCOME IT. TRAORE AND I WILL IN ANY
CASE BE DISCUSSING CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA QUESTIONS
FURTHER.

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